43 replies to this topic

[Adelfos]

gambit, on 2008-07-13 23:59, said:

, gdyby tylko wszyscy przyklaskiwali?

Byle nie podczas wędkowania, bo są tu zapewne bardziej od innych (rzeczy) miłujący ryby.

[mirek]

Skan z leksykonu Thayer rozważanego w tym wątku greckiego słowa ICHTHYS oznaczającego ryba a będącego na początku symbolem chrześcijan:



Jest jeszcze inne słowo będące synonimem i mające znaczenie małej ryby a więc rybki - OPSARION występujące na przykład w miejscach J 6:9,11 czy też J 21:9,10,13:

[mirek]

Oczywiście powinno się w tym temacie przytoczyć również definicje pojęć, które przewijają się podczas rozmowy Piotra z Panem Jezusem. Są to czasowniki będące synonimami słowa "miłować". Definicje podaję za leksykonem Thayer:

AGAPAO - miłować, kochać



PHILEO - kochać, miłować, lubić; całować


Jestem przekonany, iż każdy słyszał również o istnieniu w języku greckim czterech różnych słów oznaczających "miłość". Przypomnijmy, że są to:

AGAPE - miłość bezinteresowna oparta na zasadach, ofiarna, pełna poświęcenia i troski o drugą osobę
PHILIA - miłość platoniczna, wolna od seksu i zmysłowości, przyjacielska, bezinteresowna, lojalna i wierna
STORGE - miłość, czułość, przywiązanie zwłaszcza w relacjach rodzinnych
EROS - miłość erotyczna, twórcza, kreatywna i romantyczna

Dwa pierwsze słowa występują w NT, dwa ostatnie nie.

Oto krótki diagram ukazujący relacje różnych rodzajów miłości między osobami:



Rysunek pochodzi z artykułu: http://home.clara.ne...v/loveofgod.htm

[mirek]

W poście wyżej podałem definicje słów AGAPAO oraz PHILEO a także wyjaśniłem różnice pomiędzy nimi. Oto co na temat ma do powiedzenia jeszcze Richard C. Trench w swoim "Słowniku Synonimów Nowego Testamentu" (strony 41-44):

We have made no attempt to discriminate between these words in our English Version. And yet there is often a difference between them, well worthy to have been noted and reproduced, if this had lain within the compass of our language; being very nearly equivalent to that between ‘diligo’ and ‘amo’ in the Latin. To understand the exact distinction between these, will help us to understand that between those other which are the more immediate object of our inquiry. For this we possess abundant material in Cicero, who often sets the words in instructive antithesis to one another. Thus, writing to one friend of the affection in which he holds another (Ep. Fam. xiii.47): ‘Ut scires illum a me non diligi solum, verum etiam amari;’ and again (Ad Brut. 1): ‘L. Clodius valde me diligit, vel, ut εμφατικωτερον dicam, valde me amat.’ From these and other like passages (there is an ample collection of them in Döderlein’s Latein. Synon. vol. iv. pp. 98 seq.), we might conclude that ‘amare,’ which answers to φιλειν, is stronger than ‘diligere,’ which, as we shall see, corresponds to αγαπαν. This is true, but not all the truth. Ernesti has successfully seized the law of their several uses, when he says: ‘Diligere magis ad judicium, amare veto ad intimum animi sensum pertinet.’ So that, in fact, Cicero in the passage first quoted is saying,—‘I do not esteem the man merely, but I love him; there is something of the passionate warmth of affection in the feeling with which I regard him.’

It will follow, that while a friend may desire rather ‘amari’ than ‘diligi’ by his friend, there are aspects in which the ‘diligi’ is more than the ‘amari,’ the αγαπασθαι than the φιλεισθαι. The first expresses a more reasoning attachment, of choice and selection (‘diligere’==‘ deligere’), from a seeing in the object upon whom it is bestowed that which is worthy of regard; or else from a sense that such is due toward the person so regarded, as being a benefactor, or the like; while the second, without being necessarily an unreasoning attachment, does yet give less account of itself to itself; is more instinctive, is more of the feelings or natural affections, implies more passion; thus Antonius, in the funeral discourse addressed to the Roman people over the body of Caesar: εφιλησατε αυτον ως πατερα, και ηγαπησατε ως ευεργετην (Dion Cassius, xliv. 48). And see in Xenophon (Mem. ii. 7. 9. 12) two passages throwing much light on the relation between the words, and showing how the notions of respect and reverence are continually implied in the αγαπαν, which, though not excluded by, are still not involved in, the φιλειν. Thus in the second of these, αι μεν ως κηδεμονα εφιλουν, ο δε ως ωφελιμους ηγαπα. Out of this it may be explained, that while men are continually bidden αγαπαν τον Θεον (Matt. 22:37; Luke 10:27; 1 Cor. 8:3), and good men declared so to do (Rom. 8:28; 1 Pet. 1:8; 1 John 4:21), the φιλειν τον Θεον is commanded to them never. The Father, indeed, both αγαπα τον Υιον (John 3:35), and also φιλει τον Υιον (John 5:20); with the first of which statements such passages as Matt. 3:17, with the second such as John 1:18; Prov. 8:22, 30, may be brought into connection.

In almost all these passages of the N. T., the Vulgate, by the help of ‘diligo’ and ‘amo,’ has preserved a distinction which we have let go. This is especially to be regretted at John 21:15-17; for the passing there of the original from one word to the other is singularly instructive, and should by no means escape us unnoticed. In that threefold “Lovest thou Me?” which the risen Lord addresses to Peter, He asks him first, αγαπας με; At this moment, when all the pulses in the heart of the now penitent Apostle are beating with a passionate affection toward his Lord, this word on that Lord’s lips sounds far too cold; to very imperfectly express the warmth of his affection toward Him. The question in any form would have been grievous enough (ver. 17); the language in which it is clothed makes it more grievous still.¹ He therefore in his answer substitutes for the αγαπας of Christ the word of a more personal love, φιλω σε (ver. 15). And this he does not on the first occasion only, but again upon a second. And now at length he has triumphed; for when his Lord puts the question to him a third time, it is not αγαπας any more, but φιλεις. All this subtle and delicate play of feeling disappears perforce, in a translation which either does not care, or is not able, to reproduce the variation in the words as it exists in the original.

I observe in conclusion that ερως, εραν, εραστης, never occur in the N. T., but the two latter occasionally in the Septuagint; thus εραν, Esth. 2:17; Prov. 4:6; εραστης generally in a dishonorable sense as ‘paramour’ (Ezek. 16:33; Hos. 2:5); yet once or twice (as Wisd. 8:2) more honorably, not as==‘amasius,’ but ‘amator.’ Their absence is significant. It is in part no doubt to be explained from the fact that, by the corrupt use of the world, they had become so steeped in sensual passion, carried such an atmosphere of unholiness about them (see Origen, Prol. in Cant. Opp. tom iii. pp. 28–30), that the truth of God abstained from the defiling contact with them; yea, devised a new word rather than betake itself to one of these. For it should not be forgotten that αγαπη is a word born within the bosom of revealed religion: it occurs in the Septuagint (2 Sam. 13:15; Cant. 2:4; Jer. 2:2), and in the Apocrypha (Wisd. 3:9); but there is no trace of it in any heathen writer whatever, and as little in Philo or Josephus; the utmost they attain to here is φιλανθρωπια and φιλαδελφια, and the last never in any sense but as the love between brethren in blood (cf. Cremer, Wörterbuch d. N. T. Gräcität, p. 12). But the reason may lie deeper still. ερως might have fared as so many other words have fared, might have been consecrated anew, despite of the deep degradation of its past history;² and there were tendencies already working for this ill the Platonist use of it, namely, as the longing and yearning desire after that unseen but eternal Beauty, the faint vestiges of which may here be everywhere traced;³ ουρανιος, Philo in this sense has called it (De Vit. Cont. 2; De Vit. Mos. 1). But in the very fact that ερως (==ο δεινος ιμερος, Sophocles, Trach. 476), did express this yearning desire (Euripides, Ion, 67; Alcestis, 1101); this longing after the unpossessed (in Plato’s exquisite mythus, Symp. 203 b, ερως is the offspring of Πενια), lay its deeper unfitness to set forth that Christian love, which is not merely the sense of need, of emptiness, of poverty, with the longing after fullness, not the yearning after an unattained and in this world unattainable Beauty; but a love to God and to man, which is the consequence of God’s love already shed abroad in the hearts of his people. The mere longing and yearning, and ερως at the best is no more, has given place, since the Incarnation, to the love which is not in desire only, but also in possession. That ερως is no more is well expressed in the lines of Gregory Nazianzene (Carm. ii. 34, 150, 151):

Ποθος δ' ορεξις η καλων η μη καλων,
ερως δε θερμος δυσκαθεκτος τε ποθος.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

¹ Bengel generally has the honour ‘rem acu tetigisse;’ here he has singularly missed the point and is wholly astray; ‘ααπαν, amare, est necessitudinis et affectûs; φιλειν, diligere, judicii.’

² On the attempt which some Christian writers had made to distinguish between ‘amor’ and ‘dilectio’ or ‘caritas,’ see Augustine, De Civ. Dei, xiv. 7: ‘Nonnulli arbitrantur aliud esse dilectionem sive caritatem, aliud amorem. Dicunt enim dilectionem accipiendam esse in bono, amorem in malo.’ He shows, by many examples of ‘dilectio’ and ‘diligo’ used in an ill sense in the Latin Scriptures, of ‘amor’ and ‘amo’ in a good, the impossibility of maintaining any such distinction.

³ I cannot regard as an evidence of such reconsecration the well-known words of Ignatius, Ad Rom. 7: ο εμος ερως εσταυρωται. It is far more consistent with the genius of these Ignatian Epistles to take ερως subjectively here, ‘My love of the world is crucified,’ i.e. with Christ; rather than objectively, ‘Christ, the object of my love, is crucified.’